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Crime, Punishment and Article 3 ECHR: Puzzles and Prospects of Applying an 
Absolute Right in a Penal Context 
 
Natasa Mavronicola* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which provides that ‘No 
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, is 
considered to enshrine an absolute right. Yet it contains an under-explored element: inhuman 
and degrading punishment. While torture has been the subject of extensive academic 
commentary, and inhuman and degrading treatment has been examined to some extent, the 
prohibition of inhuman and degrading punishment has not been explored in significant depth, 
in spite of its considerable potential to alter the penal landscape. 
 
This paper elucidates the key doctrinal elements of inhuman and degrading punishment ‘and 
treatment associated with it’, in the words of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
It addresses a number of ‘puzzles’ or problems which arise in applying the absolute right 
enshrined in Article 3 of the ECHR to sentencing and imprisonment, clarifies ECtHR 
doctrine and highlights some of its key implications. Bringing a theoretically informed 
understanding to bear on the application of Article 3 of the ECHR in a penal context, the 
paper provides clarity and coherence to a complex and crucial intersection between human 
rights and penology. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights, inhuman and degrading 
treatment, inhuman and degrading punishment, dignity, penology, penal theory, Vinter v UK 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’)1 provides that ‘No one 
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ and is 
considered to enshrine an absolute right: one that is not displaceable through consequentialist 
considerations.
2
 The right’s interpretation is thus the beginning and end of its delimitation – 
and sets a line between lawful and unlawful State behaviour. The significance of this 
interpretation cannot, therefore, be overstated. As this paper highlights, the ramifications of 
applying Article 3 in a particular context can be extensive.  
 
                                                          
* Dr Natasa Mavronicola, Lecturer in Law, Queen’s University Belfast (n.mavronicola@qub.ac.uk). I am very 
grateful to Professor David Feldman, Dr Liora Lazarus, Dr Anne-Marie McAlinden, to participants at the SLSA 
Annual Conference 2014, and to the anonymous referee for their valuable and constructive comments.  
1
 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, ETS 5. 
2
 See Mavronicola, ‘What is an “absolute right”? Deciphering Absoluteness in the Context of Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 12(4) Human Rights Law Review 723. See, however, Addo and 
Grief, ‘Does Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Enshrine Absolute Rights?’ (1998) 9 
European Journal of International Law 510. 
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In examining the parameters of Article 3 ECHR, commentators often subsume punishment 
within treatment;
3
 but this can elide the particular conceptual issues which arise in relation to 
punishment, ‘or treatment associated with it’,4 as aggregated in the words of the European 
Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’ or ‘the Court’). Although principles applicable to inhuman 
and degrading treatment are largely applicable to inhuman and degrading punishment, there 
are nuanced variables which apply only in relation to punishment. Unfortunately, while 
torture has been the subject of extensive academic commentary and inhuman and degrading 
treatment has been explored academically to some degree, the prohibition of inhuman and 
degrading punishment and ‘treatment associated with [punishment]’ has not been examined 
sufficiently.
5
 This has arisen, in part, due to the ECtHR’s own lack of transparent 
taxonomisation;
6
 yet the analysis below highlights that the ECtHR frequently employs special 
principles and reasoning methods in the context of punishment and treatment associated with 
it, which carry both significant implications and challenges for those seeking to understand 
Article 3 and apply it in a penal context.  
 
After an outline of the principles underpinning Article 3 ECHR and its interpretation by the 
ECtHR, this paper illustrates the significance of inhuman and degrading punishment ‘or 
treatment associated with it’ as a distinct element of Article 3 ECHR. Addressing a number of 
‘puzzles’ or problems which arise in applying the absolute right enshrined in Article 3 of the 
ECHR to sentencing and imprisonment, this paper elucidates ECtHR doctrine and highlights 
some of its key implications, bringing a theoretically informed understanding to bear on the 
application of Article 3 of the ECHR in a penal context. Penological perspectives are weaved 
into the substance of the legal principles emerging from key cases, notably the recent 
judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Vinter v UK.
7
 The paper aims to bring 
clarity and coherence to this complex and crucial intersection between human rights and 
penology. 
 
ARTICLE 3: ABSOLUTE NATURE AND SUBSTANTIVE SCOPE 
 
Article 3’s absolute nature and its implications 
                                                          
3
 See, for instance, White and Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights, 5th 
edn (2010) at 174; Erdal and Bakirci, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights: A Practitioner’s 
Handbook (2006) at chapter 10. 
4
 A v United Kingdom Application No 3455/05, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 19 February 2009, at para 127. See 
also, among others, Ramirez Sanchez v France Application No 59450/00, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 4 July 
2006, at para 119; Kulikowski v Poland (No 2) Application No 16831/07, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 9 October 
2012, at para 61. 
5
 Note, however, the extensive coverage of the protection Article 3 affords to prisoners in Cooper, Cruelty – an 
analysis of Article 3 (2003) at chapters 4 and 7. Note also some of the coverage in Van Zyl Smit and Snacken, 
Principles of European Prison Law and Policy (2009). 
6
 This is noted in Harris et al., Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 2nd edn (2009) at 91, citing Keenan v United Kingdom Application No 27229/95, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 3 April 2001, of which see the finding at para 115. 
7
 Vinter and others v United Kingdom Application Nos 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction (Grand Chamber), 9 July 2013 (Vinter [GC]). See the case analysis in Mavronicola, ‘Inhuman and 
Degrading Punishment, Dignity, and the Limits of Retribution’ (2014) 77(2) Modern Law Review 292; and see 
the account and suggestions provided in Van Zyl Smit, Weatherby, and Creighton, ‘Whole Life Sentences and 
the Tide of European Human Rights Jurisprudence: What Is to Be Done?’ (2014) 14(1) Human Rights Law 
Review 59. See, however, the UK government’s reaction: Watt and Travis, ‘Tory ministers condemn ECHR 
ruling on whole-life prison sentences’, Guardian, 9 July 2013.  
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Article 3 of the ECHR has been described – often emphatically – as an ‘absolute right’ by the 
ECtHR,
8
 consistently and over a significant length of time,
9
 resulting in a rich body of case 
law dealing with Article 3’s application in a range of situations.10 Its absolute nature has often 
played a decisive role in addressing the issues arising in cases before the ECtHR.
11
 Indeed, 
Mowbray recently referred to it as ‘the most absolute right guaranteed by the Convention’.12 
Although suggesting that the absolute character of Article 3 ECHR is a matter of degree is in 
my view inapposite, this description reflects just how consistently the ECtHR has affirmed 
Article 3’s absolute nature. 
 
The absolute character of Article 3 ECHR forms the topic of analysis in my article titled 
‘What is an “absolute right”?’,13 which sets up a theoretical framework addressing two 
parameters of investigation: applicability and specification. The applicability parameter 
relates to whether and when a standard can be lawfully displaced; the specification parameter 
explores the way the standard characterised as absolute is ‘specified’, that is, concretised and 
delimited.
14
 Looking at the applicability parameter, I suggest that the key structural 
implication of the absolute nature of a right is that the obligations it encompasses cannot be 
lawfully displaced by consequentialist concerns. This could be described as the essence of 
what it means for a right to be absolute. The absolute nature of Article 3 ECHR is broken 
down into the following three elements: 
(1) Article 3 makes no provision for lawful exceptions; in contrast to other Articles within the 
ECHR, it cannot be infringed insofar as ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in pursuit of a 
legitimate aim.  
(2)  Article 15 of the ECHR, which governs the derogation from obligations under the ECHR 
in exceptional circumstances, does not allow for any derogation from Article 3.  
(3) Protection from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment applies 
irrespective of the victim’s conduct; thus, whether the victim or potential victim is an 
innocent child or a cold-blooded murderer, they enjoy the protection of Article 3 alike.
15
 
 
These three elements highlight the significance of specification, which determines the 
substantive scope of the right. I suggest that the specification of Article 3 must remain 
faithful to the values underpinning it, while not amounting to implicit displacement of the 
right. On this account, Article 3 must be interpreted according to what it is meant to 
                                                          
8
 The wording used by the Court varies, with the oft-repeated statement being that ‘[t]he Convention prohibits in 
absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ (Ireland v United Kingdom 
Application No 5310/71, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 18 January 1978, at para 163). The Court also refers to 
‘the absolute character of Article 3’ (Chahal v United Kingdom Application No 22414/93, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 15 November 1996, at para 96) and to Article 3 as an ‘absolute right’ (Al-Adsani v United Kingdom 
Application No 35763/97, Merits, 21 November 2001, at para 59). 
9
 The first finding of a breach of Article 3 by the Strasbourg Court was in 1978, in Ireland v United Kingdom, 
ibid.; but see also the Commission Report in The Greek Case (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v 
Greece) Application Nos 3321/6, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67, Commission Report, 5 November 1969. 
10
 This includes over 1458 findings of substantive violation of Article 3 by 2013, based on ECtHR Report on 
Violations by Article and by respondent State (1959-2013), at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_1959_2013_ENG.pdf > (last accessed 16 January 2015). 
11
 See, for instance, Chahal, supra n 8. 
12
 Mowbray, ‘A Study of the Principle of Fair Balance in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (2010) 10(2) Human Rights Law Review 289, 307. Cf Battjes, ‘In Search of a Fair Balance: The 
Absolute Character of the Prohibition of Refoulement under Article 3 ECHR Reassessed’ (2009) 22(3) Leiden 
Journal of International Law 583. 
13
 Mavronicola, ‘What is an “absolute right”?’, supra n 2.  
14
 Ibid. at 729. 
15
 These are taken from Mavronicola, ibid. at 737 (citations omitted), citing – inter alia – Chahal, supra n 8.  
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safeguard.
16
 The centrality of dignity as a value underpinning Article 3 has emerged 
repeatedly in many key judgments of the ECtHR, not least those involving the specification 
of inhuman and degrading punishment.
17
 Some key implications of this are examined below. 
 
Article 3’s threshold(s) 
The threshold which separates torture from other types of proscribed ill-treatment falling 
within the scope of Article 3 ECHR understandably attracts significant interest
18
 and, in 
certain contexts, may carry special implications.
19
 Nonetheless, it is the threshold between 
what amounts to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and what does not (and is 
thus outside the scope of Article 3 ECHR) which is key to drawing the line of conclusively 
unlawful treatment or punishment under Article 3 ECHR: this is, effectively, the Article 3 
threshold.  
 
Underpinning the Article 3 threshold is a statement originally found in Ireland v UK: ‘ill-
treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 
3’.20  The Court has asserted that ‘[t]he assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, 
relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, 
its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the 
victim…’,21 as well as the ‘nature and context of the treatment’.22  
 
Inhuman treatment has been described as ‘“ill-treatment” that attains a minimum level of 
severity and involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering’,23 while 
degrading treatment has been described as treatment which ‘humiliates or debases an 
individual showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity or arouses 
feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual's moral and physical 
resistance’.24  
 
Some academic commentary suggests that ‘degrading’ treatment (or punishment) represents 
the lowest level of ill-treatment caught by Article 3.
25
 This view is not explicitly reflected in 
the case law of the ECtHR. Rather, the distinction between inhuman and degrading treatment 
(or punishment) is primarily qualitative. The terms ‘inhuman’ and ‘degrading’ encompass acts 
with distinct qualities, with potentially distinct effects on the victim, captured in the differing 
tests just outlined. Though the term ‘inhuman’ is linked primarily to the infliction of 
                                                          
16
 For an account of this method of interpretation, see generally Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986). 
17
 See, for instance, Keenan, supra n 6 at para 112; Selmouni v France Application No 25803/94, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 28 July 1999, at para 99; Rahimi v Greece Application No 8687/08, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 5 
April 2011, at para 60; and, recently on punishment, Kafkaris v Cyprus Application No 21906, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 12 February 2008, para 96; Vinter [GC], supra n 7 at para 113. 
18
 See, for instance, Ze’ev Bekerman, ‘Torture—The Absolute Prohibition of a Relative Term: Does Everyone 
Know What Is in Room 101?’ (2005) 53 American Journal of Comparative Law 743. 
19
 In Gäfgen v Germany Application No 22978/05, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 1 June 2010, the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR suggested that real evidence obtained by torture can never be used against someone in 
criminal proceedings without violating Article 6 ECHR, whilst the use of real evidence obtained by other Article 
3 treatment may entail violation of Article 6 ECHR: see Gäfgen at para 167. 
20
 Ireland v United Kingdom, supra n 8 at para 162. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 A v United Kingdom Application No 25599/94, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 23 September 1998, at para 20. 
23
 Pretty v United Kingdom Application No 2346/02, Merits, 29 April 2002, at para 52. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 See Vorhaus, ‘On Degradation. Part One: Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2002) 
31(4) Common Law World Review 374 at 375. See also Arai-Yokoi, ‘Grading Scale of Degradation: Identifying 
the Threshold of Degrading Treatment or Punishment under Article 3 ECHR’ (2003) 21 Netherlands Quarterly 
of Human Rights 385 at 420-421. 
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suffering, the term ‘degrading’ can capture subjection to something whose severity stems 
from the humiliation or debasement caused.
26
 The test of ‘minimum level of severity’ set up 
in Ireland v UK is overarching in the specification of ‘inhuman’ and of ‘degrading’ 
treatment.
27
  
 
Though there are predictability concerns with the overarching ‘minimum level of severity’ 
test,
28
 one method for elucidating it is identifying types of treatment which have resulted in a 
finding of inhuman or degrading treatment and to identify treatment that appears to lie at the 
very boundaries of Article 3. This method is followed, implicitly or explicitly, in a number of 
textbooks,
29
 while practitioners’ books and guides have emerged which set out the vast 
variety of circumstances in which breaches of Article 3 have been found.
30
 Instances in which 
the threshold has been found to be crossed include, among many, unnecessary or excessive 
physical force used by police against protesters (inhuman and degrading treatment);
31
 
prolonged discriminatory practices (degrading treatment);
32
 and the subjection of a disabled 
person to standard imprisonment (degrading treatment).
33
 
 
 
 
INHUMAN AND DEGRADING PUNISHMENT: A DISTINCT FACET OF ARTICLE 
3 ECHR 
 
Punishment raises complications in the interpretation of Article 3 which can be missed in a 
more generic analysis, especially one which subsumes punishment within treatment. These 
must be addressed in order to confront fundamental questions on how the determination of 
what is Article 3-(in)compatible punishment relates to the absolute character of Article 3 
ECHR – particularly, whether it can undermine the absolute character of Article 3.  
 
In my view a number of elements distinguish punishment from treatment in a theoretically 
and doctrinally significant manner: 
 
1) its punitive character: although the point is tautological, it is significant that 
punishment is not a neutral term in the same way that treatment is. It carries the 
implication of a penalty for particular behaviour and entails that someone is being 
subjected to something undesirable or unpleasant in response to a behaviour perceived 
as unacceptable.
34
 
                                                          
26
 This is highlighted by Vorhaus, ibid. at 395. 
27
 Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom Application Nos 7511/76 and 7743/76, Merits, 25 February 1982, at 
para 28; see also Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom Application No 13134/87, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 25 
March 1993, paras 30-32; Raninen v Finland Application No 20972/92, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 16 
December 1997, at para 50. 
28
 See the criticism in Mavronicola, ‘What is an “absolute right”?’, supra n 2 at 742-752. 
29
 See, for instance, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, supra n 6 at chapter 3. 
30
 See, in particular, Erdal and Bakirci, supra n 3; Cooper, supra n 5. 
31
 Güler and Öngel v Turkey Application Nos 29612/05 and 30668/05, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 4 October 
2011. 
32
 Cyprus v Turkey Application No 25781/94, Merits, 10 May 2001. 
33
  Price v United Kingdom Application No 33394/96, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 10 July 2001. See also 
instances outlined in the analysis below. 
34
 See, generally, the nuanced account in Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (2001). 
Interestingly, the ECtHR uses the term ‘punishment’ (rather than retribution) in its outline of the four 
penological grounds on which imprisonment may legitimately be based: ‘punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation 
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2) its institutional nature: punishment entails a treatment meted out by State institutions 
in an institutional setting.
35
 
3) its pre-conceived legitimacy: the distinct category of ‘punishment’, encompassing as 
it does retributive and institutional qualities, does not only carry the implication of a 
penalty vis-à-vis a particular action,  but one which is prima facie legitimately 
punitive – that is, legitimately undesirable or unpleasant and inflicted in response to 
behaviour deemed to be unacceptable. 
These characteristics can impact not only on what quintessentially falls under the label 
‘punishment’, but also on what the ECtHR describes as ‘treatment associated with it’.36 A 
vast array of actions and situations may be caught within these terms, including sentencing 
and conditions of imprisonment or acts or omissions pertaining to those in custody.  
 
These three characteristics carry significant implications for the way the prohibition on 
inhuman and degrading punishment is interpreted. What degree of unpleasantness involved in 
punishment – and incarceration in particular – is legitimate, falling short of inhumanity or 
degradation? And how does the notion of acceptable or deserved suffering interact with the 
absolute prohibition on treating individuals in an inhuman or degrading manner? The two 
central puzzles which arise in applying the absolute right enshrined in Article 3 ECHR in a 
penal context can be labelled the legitimacy loop and the justification/absoluteness puzzle.  
 
THE LEGITIMACY LOOP 
 
The pre-conceived legitimacy characterising ‘punishment’ emerges forcefully in the ECtHR's 
doctrine on the subject. Given Article 3’s absolute character, it would seem that in dealing 
with the question whether a particular punishment crosses the Article 3 threshold, the Court 
must determine what is proscribed by Article 3, and is thus conclusively illegitimate, and 
what is not. Yet the Court evokes legitimacy as a criterion on the basis of which a punishment 
is not to be found inhuman or degrading: ‘In order for a punishment or treatment associated 
with it to be “inhuman” or “degrading”, the suffering or humiliation involved must go beyond 
that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate 
treatment or punishment’.37 The Court thus propounds a circular test, through which what is 
conclusively illegitimate is to be delimited by considering whether it goes beyond what is 
legitimate.
38
 The quantitative aspect of the test (‘must go beyond’) is indelibly tied to the 
question of what amounts to ‘a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment’.39 The 
latter question requires investigation.  
 
The Court’s concrete approach in contexts other than imprisonment transpires from cases 
such as Chember
40
 and Tyrer.
41
 Chember concerned the imposition of military discipline on 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and protection of the public’ – see Vinter [GC], supra n 7 at para 40. Note the wider critical discourse on 
punishment, traced in Simon and Sparks, ‘Punishment and Society: The Emergence of an Academic Field’ in 
Simon and Sparks (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Punishment and Society (2013) at 1-20. 
35
 See the ‘five rules of punishment’: Scott, Penology (2008) at 18. 
36
 See supra n 4. 
37
 A v United Kingdom (2009), supra n 4 at para 127 (emphasis added). 
38
 Consider also Article 1 of the UNCAT, which provides that torture ‘does not include pain or suffering arising 
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions’. This issue is discussed in Wouters, ‘Editorial: How 
Absolute is the Prohibition on Torture?’ (2006) 8(1) European Journal of Migration and Law 1 at 2-3. 
39
 A v United Kingdom (2009), supra n 4 at para 127. 
40
 Chember v Russia Application No 7188/03, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 3 July 2008. 
41
 Tyrer v United Kingdom Application No 5856/72, Merits, 25 April 1978. 
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the applicant, consisting of performing a number of knee bends, in the knowledge of the 
applicant’s severe knee-related health problems, bringing the applicant to the point of 
physical collapse. Although strenuous physical exercise was recognised as a prima facie 
legitimate element of military discipline,
42
 the Court also emphasised that ‘the State has a 
duty to ensure that a person performs military service in conditions which are compatible 
with respect for his human dignity’.43 In light of the circumstances of the applicant and the 
knowledge of the officials imposing the penalty, it was found by the Court to constitute 
inhuman punishment contrary to Article 3.
44
 This highlights that the particular circumstances 
of an individual may, in exacerbating the suffering or debasement caused to him or her, 
render a ‘given’ form of ‘legitimate’ treatment or punishment (here within the military 
context) inhuman or degrading.  
 
On the other hand, the sheer institutionalisation of violence was central to the Court’s finding 
of degrading punishment in Tyrer. The element of pre-conceived legitimacy was absent in the 
reasoning of the Court.
45
 Rather, the Court highlighted that State-sanctioned physical 
punishment is intrinsically degrading.
46
 Tyrer exposes the dehumanising character of 
violence as punishment.
47
 
 
The imposition of imprisonment, aspects of imprisonment, and measures related to 
imprisonment, constitute the most prominent field of application of the ECtHR’s principles 
on punishment ‘or treatment associated with it’. Imprisonment raises a number of 
complications with respect to the legitimacy ‘loop’. Returning to the idea of ‘legitimate 
treatment or punishment’, would compatibility with the requirements of Article 5 ECHR, 
which governs the right to liberty, render incarceration ‘legitimate’? The Court’s doctrine 
indicates that the suffering and humiliation associated with Article 5-compatible institutional 
incarceration can prima facie be taken to constitute a ‘given form of legitimate treatment or 
punishment’.48 This emerges from the Court’s approach to detention: 
 
The Court has consistently stressed that the suffering and humiliation involved 
must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation 
connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment. Measures 
depriving a person of his liberty may often involve such an element. In 
accordance with Article 3 of the Convention the State must ensure that a 
person is detained under conditions which are compatible with respect for his 
human dignity and that the manner and method of the execution of the measure 
do not subject him to distress or hardship exceeding the unavoidable level of 
suffering inherent in detention...
49
 
 
Thus a key question arises: what is ‘the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention’? 
This raises penological issues of considerable significance and controversy, which the Court 
                                                          
42
 Chember, supra n 40 at para 52. 
43
 Ibid. at para 50. 
44
 Ibid. at paras 48-57. 
45
 White and Ovey, supra n 3 at 175. 
46
 Tyrer, supra n 41 at paras 33-35. See also Artyomov v Russia Application No 14146/02, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 27 May 2010, at para 169; Jabari v Turkey Application No 40035/98, Merits, 11 July 2000. 
47
 In the face of Tyrer and much subsequent case law, however, see the current plans for corporal punishment in 
the UK: Travis, ‘Grayling gives green light for staff to use force against inmates in new jail’, Guardian, 16 
October 2014.  
48
 This does not mean that Article 5-incompatible incarceration will necessarily also be contrary to Article 3. 
49
 Kafkaris, supra n 17 at para 96 (emphasis added). See also Ramirez Sanchez, supra n 4 at para 119. 
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has not addressed holistically. Nonetheless, key elements of the Court’s approach can be 
discerned through a theoretically informed reading of the case law.  
 
One strand of conceptual analysis which addresses a related question through the lens of 
liberty is Lazarus’ thesis regarding ‘residual liberty’.50 On this theory, the prisoner’s legal 
position must rest on a ‘divisible conception of liberty’, which distinguishes clearly between 
the liberty lost and restriction of rights which is inherent to the imposition of the custodial 
sentence on the one hand, and the further requirements of prison administration on the other 
hand.
51
 This is based on the premise that the only rights-compatible approach to 
imprisonment is one which rejects the outdated idea of ‘forfeiture’ of rights.52  
 
Adapting Lazarus’ analysis towards addressing the question of what constitutes unavoidable 
suffering or humiliation inherent in detention, it can be said that whilst a degree of suffering 
inevitably stems from the deprivation of liberty, which is the essence of incarceration,
53
 other 
elements above and beyond the deprivation of liberty may operate to cause additional distress 
or hardship. It is through such ‘extra’ distress and/or hardship that the Article 3 threshold may 
be reached.  
 
Elements which may exacerbate the suffering or humiliation experienced in detention so as to 
cross the Article 3 threshold may simply comprise actions of State agents taken in the context 
of detention. To begin with, violent treatment of detainees, including physical, sexual and 
mental abuse, is clearly not inherent in detention and is likely to cross the Article 3 
threshold.
54
 Similarly, invasions of bodily integrity which occur in a way disrespectful to 
dignity are also likely to reach the Article 3 threshold.
55
  
 
Factors relating to the individual may also exacerbate the suffering inherent in detention, for 
instance the individual’s state of health, age, or other circumstances.56 In Farbtuhs,57 the 
Court concluded that the detention of a disabled seventy-nine-year-old applicant breached 
Article 3 on account of his age, infirmity and state of health.
58
 The Court has recognised that 
‘detention per se inevitably affects prisoners suffering from serious disorders’.59 In Mouisel, 
the Court found on the facts of the case at issue that, after a certain point, the continued 
                                                          
50
 Lazarus, ‘Conceptions of Liberty Deprivation’ (2006) 69(5) Modern Law Review 738. 
51
 Ibid. at 740-743. 
52
 The idea that imprisonment involves rights-forfeiture has been emphatically rejected by the ECtHR in Golder 
v United Kingdom Application No 4451/70, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 21 July 1975 and Hirst v United 
Kingdom (No 2) Application No 74025/01, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 6 October 2005. For a critical 
assessment of the forfeiture argument, see Lippke, ‘Criminal Offenders and Right Forfeiture’ (2001) 32(1) 
Journal of Social Philosophy 78. 
53
 The suffering involved is deemed acceptable (though not by all) in accordance with the goal(s) of 
imprisonment; see the analysis in Duff and Garland, A Reader on Punishment (1994) at 2-6. Note, however, the 
critical stance in Mathiesen, Prison on Trial (3rd edn, Waterside Press 2006); Irwin and Owen, ‘Harm and the 
contemporary prison’ in Liebling and Maruna (eds), The Effects of Imprisonment (2005) at 94.  
54
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55
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detention of a cancer sufferer ‘undermined his dignity and entailed particularly acute hardship 
that caused suffering beyond that inevitably associated with a prison sentence and treatment 
for cancer’, and thus that his continued detention was inhuman and degrading.60 
 
A similar assessment takes place in relation to disability,
61
 which lay at the heart of the issue 
in Price,
62
 where a thalidomide victim’s incarceration without special facilities was found to 
amount to degrading treatment.  In Zarzycki, the Court affirmed that ‘[w]here the authorities 
decide to place and maintain in detention a person with disabilities, they should demonstrate 
special care in guaranteeing such conditions as correspond to his special needs resulting from 
his disability’.63  
 
Addressing predictability concerns to some extent, the Court has given guidance on the 
factors it examines in determining whether the detention of an individual may be 
incompatible with Article 3 in light of the individual’s state of health: ‘(a) the medical 
condition of the prisoner, (b) the adequacy of the medical assistance and care provided in 
detention and (c) the advisability of maintaining the detention measure in view of the state of 
health of the applicant’.64 Cases in which the state of health of an individual has rendered the 
particular (usually standard) form of detention incompatible with Article 3 abound.
65
  
 
The above examples provide some guidance regarding how the Court determines the 
compatibility of detention with Article 3 in light of all relevant circumstances, notably factors 
impacting on the dignity of the detainee in the sense of fundamental respect for his or her 
sense of integrity, but also his or her physical and mental well-being.
66
 What emerges is that 
‘standard’ detention can exceed the suffering inherent in detention and reach the Article 3 
threshold on account of the detainee’s particular circumstances. This entails that the State 
must ensure that detainees who face significant vulnerability in a prison setting are either not 
subject to detention, or that their detention is adapted in numerous and context-specific ways 
to ensure that their dignity is respected.
67
  
 
Beyond problems specific to individual detainees, the Court has frequently found a violation 
of Article 3 on account of a lack of personal space afforded to detainees,
68
 with the 
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 Mouisel v France Application No 67263/01, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 14 November 2002, at para 48. 
61
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62
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65
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rights’ [2009] 1 Web JCLI, at <http://www.bailii.org/uk/other/journals/WebJCLI/2009/issue1/foster1.html> 
(last accessed 16 January 2015).  
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 The interplay between dignity, vulnerability and health is highlighted in Bedford, ‘MS v United Kingdom: 
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 See, among many, Generalov v Russia Application No 24325/03, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 9 July 2009, at 
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paras 105-109; Labzov v Russia Application No 62208/00, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 16 June 2005, at paras 
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recognition on some occasions that these problems are of a ‘structural nature’.69 Other 
elements which are not considered ‘inherent’ in detention and may breach Article 3 ECHR 
include conditions such as those exemplified in Peers v Greece, where ‘for at least two 
months, the applicant had to spend a considerable part of each 24-hour period practically 
confined to his bed in a cell with no ventilation and no window which would at times become 
unbearably hot’ and ‘had to use the toilet in the presence of another inmate and be present 
while the toilet was being used by his cellmate’.70  
 
In addition, the Court has often paid close attention to restrictive detention regimes imposed 
on applicants. It has indicated that ‘[i]n assessing whether a restrictive regime may amount to 
treatment contrary to Article 3 in a given case, regard must be had to the particular 
conditions, the stringency of the regime, its duration, the objective pursued and its effects on 
the person concerned’.71 The legitimacy loop is less prominent here: instead of attributing a 
pre-conceived legitimacy to certain prison regimes such as solitary confinement, the Court is 
inherently sceptical of these – hence necessitating justificatory reasoning from Government. 
The issue is addressed under the justification/absoluteness puzzle below. 
 
Lastly, the Court has asserted that ‘when assessing conditions of detention, account has to be 
taken of the cumulative effects of those conditions, as well as the specific allegations made 
by the applicant’.72 The Court in Ahmad used the context-specific nature of the analysis 
which occurs in the interpretation and application of Article 3’s terms to suggest that it 
renders prospective judgment on, in this case, the likely incarceration of the applicants in 
supermax security prisons after extradition, unreliable.
73
 There is force to the argument that 
the Court’s specification of Article 3’s threshold tends to be of an individualised, ex post 
facto nature.
74
 However, erring on the side of caution should rather be called for in 
prospective assessments, in light of the absolute bar on certain forms of ill-treatment which 
Article 3 enshrines.
75
  
 
Erring on the side of caution is apposite not only in relation to deportation or extradition, but 
also in the formulation of prison policy and in prison management and oversight. In light of 
the growing body of case law on inhuman and degrading punishment (or treatment associated 
with it), States subject to the ECHR – and States which wish to maintain effective extradition 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
44-49; Novoselov v Russia Application No 66460/01, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 2 June 2005, at paras 41-46; 
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70
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72
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73
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Law Review 589. 
74
 Mavronicola, ‘What is an “absolute right”?’, supra n 2 at 742-752. 
75
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processes with States subject to the ECHR
76
 – must ensure that their prison practices adopt 
Article 3-compatible standards.
77
  
 
As the analysis above highlights, the legitimacy loop can be addressed through unpacking the 
Court’s punishment-specific doctrine. The ECtHR’s doctrine indicates that whilst lawfully 
ordained imprisonment and the attendant suffering it entails may be seen as prima facie 
legitimate, a number of factors may augment the severity involved so that imprisonment in 
the particular circumstances crosses the Article 3 threshold. These factors broadly reflect the 
variables cited by the Court in its test regarding the Article 3 threshold of severity.
78
 Similar 
approaches pertain to other punishment, such as military discipline. On the other hand, 
institutional corporal punishment does not enter the legitimacy loop as it is not seen as prima 
facie legitimate. Moreover, as elaborated below, some treatment associated with punishment 
may be seen as prima facie suspect, triggering justificatory reasoning.  
 
THE JUSTIFICATION/ABSOLUTENESS PUZZLE 
 
The justification/absoluteness puzzle refers to the ECtHR’s use of justificatory reasoning in 
determining what amounts to inhuman or degrading punishment. Justificatory reasoning 
arises because certain actions, including the imposition of a custodial sentence itself or a 
restrictive security measure within prison, may not be inhuman or degrading insofar as they 
remain strictly tied to appropriate grounds on which such measures can be taken without 
undermining the dignity of the individual subjected to them. On the other hand, if such action 
exceeds or otherwise fails to correspond to such justificatory premises, it may amount to an 
attack on human dignity which falls foul of Article 3.  
 
The two chief conceptual challenges arising from the use of justificatory reasoning are: first, 
that justificatory reasoning may appear equivalent to justified displacement of the right 
enshrined in Article 3 ECHR, contradicting its absolute character; and secondly, establishing 
the appropriate contours of justificatory reasoning in the determination of what is inhuman or 
degrading in a penal context requires engagement with complex, contentious principles tied 
to penology and increasingly associated with the contested value of dignity. To address these 
challenges, I explore the use of justificatory reasoning by the Court, with particular attention 
paid to the Grand Chamber judgment in Vinter v UK.
79
  
 
Penal proportionality 
The proportionality of a sentence – that is, proportionality as a penal principle80 – can 
determine whether it amounts to inhuman or degrading punishment. The Court has made the 
point that a grossly disproportionate sentence may cross the Article 3 threshold.
81
 This 
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approach can be traced back to the assessment, pre-Al Saadoon,
82
 of the compatibility of 
imposition of the death penalty with Article 3: 
 
As the Court has previously noted in connection with Art.3, the manner in 
which the death penalty is imposed or executed, the personal circumstances of 
the condemned person and a disproportionality to the gravity of the crime 
committed, as well as the conditions of detention awaiting execution, are 
examples of factors capable of bringing the treatment or punishment received 
by the condemned person within the proscription under Art.3.
83
 
 
At the same time, the Grand Chamber in Vinter emphasised that a finding of ‘gross 
disproportionality’ resulting in a breach of Article 3 would only be made ‘on rare and unique 
occasions’.84  
 
A puzzle arises: does the criterion of ‘gross disproportionality’, which encompasses 
justificatory reasoning and focuses on the offence committed by the alleged victim, not 
contradict the key principles of absoluteness as affirmed in multiple ECtHR cases? After all, 
Article 3 protects everyone no matter what – irrespective of reprehensible conduct or any 
public interest considerations in favour of displacing its protection; this is the essence of its 
absolute nature.  
 
The answer to this puzzle, however, lies in the fact that Article 3 is made up of terms such as 
‘inhuman’ and ‘degrading’, whose attribution to a particular treatment or punishment is 
context-sensitive. The (in)humanity or degradation involved in an act hinges on the way the 
act relates to the dignity of the individual subjected to it. Respect for dignity entails a 
minimum level of respect for one’s exercise of agency and choice. The application of the 
‘gross disproportionality’ criterion is tied to the retributive ‘desert theory’ of punishment, 
which is premised on the principle that those who consciously commit criminal acts deserve 
censure in the form of ‘hard treatment’ but that ‘the amount of hard treatment should remain 
proportionate to the degree of wrongdoing, respecting the offender as a moral agent’.85 As 
such, the criterion of penal proportionality is an appropriate means through which to delineate 
the boundaries of inhumanity or degradation, in the sense that it upholds respect for an 
individual’s exercise of agency.  
 
Justificatory reasoning on measures taken within the prison regime 
Justificatory reasoning is an implicit feature of the ‘legitimacy loop’: since punishment – 
notably imprisonment – is generally seen as a warranted ill when inflicted in accordance with 
the law, the suffering and humiliation ‘inherent’ in such imprisonment is acceptable while 
anything beyond it may be suspect. Yet additionally, the Court utilises justificatory reasoning 
                                                          
82
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to determine whether particular measures taken within the prison regime (‘treatment 
associated with [punishment]’) are inhuman or degrading.  
 
An area of ‘treatment associated with [punishment]’ in which justificatory reasoning has 
featured prominently is solitary confinement. The Court has affirmed, in cases such as 
Öcalan,
86
 that total sensory and social isolation is incompatible with Article 3 per se: 
‘Complete sensory isolation coupled with total social isolation can destroy the personality and 
constitutes a form of inhuman treatment which cannot be justified by the requirements of 
security or any other reason.’87 On the other hand, ‘[o]ther forms of solitary confinement 
which fall short of complete sensory isolation may also violate Article 3’.88 The latter types of 
solitary confinement call for a more fact-specific assessment: ‘[w]hile prolonged removal 
from association with others is undesirable, whether such a measure falls within the ambit of 
Article 3 of the Convention depends on the particular conditions, the stringency of the 
measure, its duration, the objective pursued and its effects on the person concerned…’.89 
 
Justificatory reasoning emerges as follows. The Court has found that prohibiting or 
preventing contact with other prisoners ‘for security, disciplinary or protective reasons’ will 
not in itself amount to inhuman treatment or punishment.
90
 Indeed, the Court frequently 
acknowledges that stringent security measures, which are intended to prevent the risk of 
escape, attack or disturbance of the prison community, exist for dangerous prisoners.
91
 Yet it 
has tended to pay close attention to such restrictions being placed on prisoners who are not 
dangerous or disorderly;
92
 restrictions which cannot be reasonably related to the purported 
objective of isolation;
93
 and restrictions which remain in place after the applicant no longer 
poses the relevant risks.
94
 In relation to such restrictive measures within imprisonment, 
according to the Court, ‘the measures taken must…be necessary to attain the legitimate aim 
pursued’.95   
 
On a study of the Court’s reasoning, it becomes clear that the ‘legitimate aims’ involved are 
narrow. The Court does not appear to espouse in any way the idea of being sent to prison 
‘for’ punishment, such that unpleasant restrictions on social interaction within prison may be 
readily accepted. Instead, the Court closely polices restrictive measures and appears to reject 
further punishment as a legitimate aim; even its reference to a ‘disciplinary’ objective must 
be read in light of its primary focus on protection – either of self or others – as the central 
criterion capable of justifying such restrictive conditions of imprisonment. This is reflected in 
cases such as AB v Russia, where the Court deplored the imposition of solitary confinement 
on an individual suspected of a non-violent economic crime who ‘had no record of disorderly 
conduct’ while in prison and regarding whom the Government had ‘not claimed that [he] was 
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in any manner dangerous, either to himself or to others’.96 The Court tends to refer to the 
security risk posed by the prisoner and assess whether the relevant measures are designed for 
the purpose of containing the risk and going no further than that; hence the Court’s strict 
proportionality-based reasoning.
97
  
 
Whilst the Court’s openness to dangerousness-based restrictions is not irreproachable, it is 
clear that the particular nature of solitary confinement, causing as it does significant distress, 
renders it a prima facie suspect measure in the view of the Court.
98
 The Court accepts that a 
degree of restrictive incarceration may be applied in a way which remains respectful of the 
dignity of the individual, insofar as it is applied solely and only to the extent necessary to 
avert risks posed by the acts of the individual subjected to it, with due safeguards for the 
individual’s health and well-being; and the onus of showing this rests on the government.99 
This signifies that the Court distinguishes restrictive measures which are tailored to what is 
necessitated by the individual’s own conduct from restrictive measures which are aimed at 
creating further suffering (and thus further punishment), finding the latter to be contrary to 
Article 3. Addressing a similar issue – the use of shackling – in his seminal book on torture, 
Waldron suggests that while the latter imposition of such measures would be an affront to 
dignity, the former would not.
100
  
 
The Court has gone so far as to set out procedural safeguards designed to ensure that the 
imposition of restrictive detention measures is narrowly delimited and robustly overseen, 
requiring such decisions to take into account the prisoner’s particular circumstances, set out 
extensive reasons and allow for independent judicial review of prolonged confinement.
101
 In 
this way the Court has sought to narrow the circumstances in which solitary confinement 
regimes are imposed and their duration, to safeguard the core of respect for both personhood 
and personality-development of prisoners. Moreover, following Vinter,
102
 as indicated below, 
the principle of rehabilitation is set to be a central consideration in this assessment. 
 
Beyond solitary confinement, justificatory reasoning features in other contexts associated 
with punishment. In Yankov
103
 the Court found that Article 3 was violated on the basis that 
the forced shaving of a detainee’s hair and beard as punishment imposed on him for writing 
critical remarks about prison warders ‘constituted an unjustified treatment of sufficient 
severity to be characterised as degrading within the meaning of Art.3’.104 The forced shaving 
was an invasion of bodily integrity which lacked a motive related to hygiene. Yankov 
involves justificatory reasoning in determining the severity of the treatment inflicted vis-à-vis 
                                                          
96
 AB v Russia, supra n 92 at para 105. 
97
 See critique of this in Smet, ‘Truly a Question of Scope Only?’, supra n 55 at 280-281. See also the critique of 
proportionality reasoning within Article 3 in Palmer, ‘A Wrong Turning: Article 3 ECHR and Proportionality’ 
(2006) 65 CLJ 438. But cf Mavronicola, ‘Güler and Öngel v Turkey’, supra n 55 at 375-381. 
98
 Regarding the problematic nature of solitary confinement more generally, see, among many works on the 
subject, Shalev, A Sourcebook on Solitary Confinement (2008), at 
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24557/1/SolitaryConfinementSourcebookPrint.pdf> (last accessed 16 January 2015); 
Grassian, ‘Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement’ (2007) 22 Washington University Journal of Law & 
Policy 325. 
99
 See, for instance, Ramirez Sanchez, supra n 4 at para 139. 
100
 See, on this, Waldron, Torture, Terror and Trade-offs: Philosophy for the White House (2012) at 297-298. 
101
 Ahmad, supra n 73 at para 212; AB v Russia, supra n 92 at para 111; Onoufriou, supra n 87 at para 70. 
102
 Vinter [GC], supra n 7. 
103
 Yankov v Bulgaria Application No 39084/97, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 11 December 2003. 
104
 Ibid. at para 120. 
15 
 
the dignity of the applicant.
105
 Such cases exemplify the context-sensitive analysis required to 
establish whether the minimum level of severity has been reached; they also reflect the 
ECtHR’s recognition of the vulnerability of those in custody, which amplifies its vigilance 
over restrictive or invasive measures they are subjected to. 
 
Justificatory reasoning and whole life orders of imprisonment 
Justificatory reasoning has also been relevant in assessing the compatibility of Article 3 
ECHR with the imposition of life imprisonment without parole (‘LWOP’).106 The most recent 
Grand Chamber judgment on the matter, Vinter v UK,
107
 involves justificatory reasoning in 
the context of LWOP but also furnishes important principles on the interpretation of inhuman 
and degrading punishment, which are likely to impact on other questions relating to prison 
administration.  
 
A key case prior to Vinter on LWOP was Kafkaris, in which the Grand Chamber suggested 
that ‘the imposition of an irreducible life sentence on an adult may raise an issue under 
Article 3’.108 The requirement of reducibility was clarified by the Grand Chamber in Vinter. 
The case concerned Article 3’s compatibility with the imposition of whole life orders – 
formerly known as ‘tariffs’, and signifying the period before an individual can be considered 
for release on parole – on individuals who had been convicted of murders with significant 
aggravating factors. In the Grand Chamber, the UK government argued that neither a life 
sentence without parole nor the serving of such a sentence were in principle incompatible 
with Article 3, submitting that the penal policy on LWOP reflected the view of domestic 
authorities and Parliament ‘that there were some crimes so grave that they were deserving of 
lifelong incarceration for the purposes of pure punishment’.109  
 
On the basis that the applicants were not arguing that their whole life orders were grossly 
disproportionate, the Grand Chamber sought to examine whether they breached Article 3 ‘on 
other grounds’.110 The general principles guiding the Grand Chamber’s examination of 
LWOP’s compatibility with Article 3 were outlined as follows. According to the Court, the 
imposition of a life sentence on adult offenders for particularly grave crimes is not in itself 
incompatible with Article 3 or any other Convention Article,
111
 yet such a sentence must be 
reducible de jure and de facto. The reducibility requirement, which demands that prisoners 
have a prospect of release, entails the possibility of ‘review of a life sentence with a view to 
its commutation, remission, termination or the conditional release of the prisoner’112 if there 
remain no legitimate penological grounds for detention.
113
  
 
The Court indicated that legitimate penological grounds for detention ‘will include 
punishment, deterrence, public protection and rehabilitation’.114 Yet it criticised the fact that 
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the denial of a review entailed ‘a risk that [the prisoner] can never atone for his offence: 
whatever the prisoner does in prison, however exceptional his progress towards 
rehabilitation, his punishment remains fixed and unreviewable’.115 Through this statement, 
the Court in fact appears to establish that purely retributive whole life sentences will violate 
Article 3, given that they extinguish the goal of rehabilitation, or at least any incentive 
towards it, as they leave no real hope of release back into society.  
 
The Grand Chamber referred with approval to the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s (Germany’s 
Federal Constitutional Court) finding in the Life Imprisonment Case that it would be 
incompatible with human dignity for a person to be deprived of freedom without any chance 
to regain it one day, a case which also established the principle of rehabilitation firmly into 
the German penal system.
116
 For the Bundesverfassungsgericht, dignity requires enabling the 
prospect of rehabilitation and reintegration into society – in other words, ‘resocialisation’; the 
prospect of compassionate release only for the infirm or terminally ill is not considered 
sufficient.
117
 According to the Grand Chamber, ‘[s]imilar considerations must apply under 
the Convention system, the very essence of which…is respect for human dignity’.118 Finally, 
the Court indicated that European and international sources on the issue supported the 
principle that all prisoners, including those under life sentences, should be offered the 
possibility of rehabilitation and the prospect of release if rehabilitated, noting that ‘the 
emphasis in European penal policy is now on the rehabilitative aim of imprisonment’.119  
 
The Court further added that it makes little sense to expect a prisoner under a whole life order 
to work towards rehabilitation without knowing whether he or she would be considered for 
release; thus, a breach of Article 3 would arise at the moment of imposition of the whole life 
sentence if it is imposed without a mechanism for review.
120
 Applying these principles to the 
case at hand, the Grand Chamber was not persuaded that the Secretary of State’s 
discretionary power to release whole life prisoners, in exceptional circumstances and on 
compassionate grounds, created a meaningful prospect of release; and it found for the 
applicants.
121
   
 
The affirmation of the procedural requirement of review by the Grand Chamber cements the 
idea that respect for the dignity of incarcerated individuals entails the prospect, though not 
the guarantee, of eventual release: in essence, a ‘right to hope’.122 Moreover, in contrast with 
the UK government, the Court does not accept that the retributive (and deterrent) purpose of 
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imprisonment
123
 can in itself justify whole life imprisonment. This is important as concerns 
the contours of the Court’s justificatory reasoning in relation to punishment under Article 3 
ECHR. The Court’s emphasis on atonement and rehabilitation does not simply adjust the 
balance of penological grounds during the course of imprisonment, though the Court appears 
to suggest that at some point.
124
 The Court’s stance defeats the possibility of Article 3-
compatible purely retributive LWOP.
125
  
 
Moreover, Vinter places human dignity at the centre of Article 3 but also the Convention 
more broadly.
126
 Evidently, Vinter does not provide us with an exhaustive or straightforward 
definition of dignity. Yet it amounts to a concrete application of it and an affirmation of a 
core of respect for both personhood and personality-development, in the preservation of hope 
and the potential for resocialisation respectively.
127
  
 
The emphasis on rehabilitation has broader implications: following Vinter, the treatment of 
prisoners must be guided primarily by principles of rehabilitation and the goal of social 
reintegration. At the same time, the ECtHR’s emphasis on rehabilitation raises the neglected 
issue of the contentious character of the rehabilitation ideal:
128
 rehabilitation may, as the 
Court sees it, be seen as a legitimate penological ground for imprisonment, and in that sense 
potentially as a component of the sentence of imprisonment;
129
 but it can also be seen as an 
outward-looking ‘resocialisation’ goal,130 barring prison terms capable of extinguishing it and 
requiring its active pursuit by the relevant bodies. To add to the contentious nature of the 
concept, the ECtHR appears to equate rehabilitation with alleviation of the risk the offender 
poses to the public,
131
 equating it to some form of ‘cure’ of the ‘pathology’ of crime – a 
perspective which is not uncontested.
132
 The Court’s consequent emphasis in its account of 
the ‘Vinter review’ on the risk the prisoner may pose raises additional concern regarding 
Vinter’s potential impetus for buttressing dangerousness-based detention and indeterminate 
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sentences.
133
 It is important for the Court to develop its doctrine concerning rehabilitation and 
reducibility with these concerns in mind. 
 
Evaluating the justification/absoluteness puzzle 
What can one make of the Court’s justificatory reasoning in the case law outlined above? 
One could argue that the Court is determining the compatibility of State action with Article 3 
in light of legitimate aims akin to those applicable in the context of qualified rights – such as 
protecting the public; and that it also seems like the protection conferred by Article 3 very 
much hinges on the good or bad character of the (alleged) victim. Considering that the key 
elements of absoluteness are the lack of exceptions and the unconditionality of Article 3 
protection,
134
 commentators may be inclined to conclude that the Court is undermining the 
absolute nature of Article 3.
135
  
 
This should be reconsidered. Attributing the adjective ‘inhuman’ or ‘degrading’ to 
punishment or treatment associated with it is dependent on a complex assessment to which 
the crime committed by the individual or the particular risk of harm he or she poses at a given 
time to self or others may be relevant. This is in line with human dignity, which requires a 
minimum level of respect for our mutual humanity,
136
 including as regards our exercise of 
agency. Punishment which ‘matches’ the offence committed by the individual can be viewed 
as respectful of the individual’s dignity in reflecting an appropriate response to conceptions 
of individual responsibility, and the limits of individual autonomy embodied in the criminal 
law and criminal justice system more broadly.
137
 Punishment which does not, if falling 
significantly foul of penal proportionality, may undermine dignity sufficiently to amount to a 
breach of Article 3. Similarly, actions which are strictly targeted towards resisting a risk 
posed by an individual’s exercise of agency – for instance, through their violent behaviour – 
and do not go beyond it, can also be respectful of dignity.
138
 At the same time, certain types 
of punishment undermine dignity per se, irrespective of the purpose with which they are 
pursued, a point which clearly emerges in ECtHR doctrine in cases such as Tyrer (on corporal 
punishment),
139
 Öcalan (on total sensory and social isolation),
140
 and Al Saadoon (on the 
death penalty).
141
 
 
Lastly, it is clear that the individual’s ‘bad character’ does not operate to displace Article 3 
protection. The vast array of findings of breach of Article 3 regarding individuals in detention 
illustrates that Article 3 protection pertains truly to all. Additionally, whilst imprisonment 
involves ‘some loss of basic human rights’,142 it also clearly amplifies the scope of positive 
obligations owed under Article 3 by the State to the incarcerated individual. The 
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powerlessness of the individual, on the one hand, and the control and proximity of State 
authorities, on the other, entail that stringent duties to provide for the individual’s ‘living 
conditions’, health and welfare arise under Article 3 in this context.143  
 
The recent Vinter judgment of the Grand Chamber also signals an emphasis on prisoner 
rehabilitation as a direct implication of dignity’s centrality in Article 3,144 a point which has 
the potential to have a considerable impact on the way prison policies will fare under Article 
3 in future, for instance in relation to the imposition of solitary confinement, the impact of 
prison administration measures on mental health, or socially and educationally sterile prison 
conditions.  
 
It would be beneficial if the Court reasoned more transparently and with a view to providing 
guidance to States on Article 3-compatible sentencing and prison regimes and, substantively, 
with greater commitment to penology. Moreover, it is likely that the Court will have to 
defend its principled stance in the face of significant challenge by certain Contracting States, 
notably the UK, which may resist what they perceive to be the rigid implications of an 
absolute right such as Article 3 ECHR in the penal context.
145
 
 
Dignity 
Dignity features in much of the Court’s reasoning on the Article 3 threshold.146 Yet dignity’s 
meaning within Article 3 ECHR is not explicitly unpacked.
147
 In the context of inhuman 
treatment or punishment the Court appears to evoke it in conveying concern for the 
individual’s bodily integrity and physical and mental well-being.148 In the context of 
degrading treatment or punishment, the Court appears to place emphasis on individuals’ 
sense of integrity and self-worth, as well as their mental well-being.
149
   
 
Maurer’s two conceptions of ‘dignity’ – an essential conception linked to inherent respect for 
personhood and a more experiential one tied to human flourishing and personality-
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development (‘la dignité actuée’)150 - appear to both be at play in the Court’s reasoning in the 
context of punishment or treatment associated with it; as can be discerned through the 
analysis offered above, the Court appears to be protecting both a core of personhood and 
fundamental facets of personality-development by zealously overseeing the degree, manner 
and contextualised experience of punishment and treatment associated with punishment under 
Article 3 ECHR. The Court therefore interprets dignity in a way which respects agency and 
individual choice (and the lawful sanctions such choice might entail), while placing limits on 
punishment or associated treatment which vitiates such respect or undermines personality-
development, such as grossly disproportionate sentences, irreducible life sentences, or the 
inappropriate imposition of isolation. In addition, the Court interprets dignity as demanding 
certain fundamentals which are key to personhood, thus barring corporal punishment and 
prison conditions occasioning profound suffering or debasement. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The ECtHR’s interpretation of inhuman and degrading punishment ‘or treatment associated 
with it’ delimits a boundary between lawful and unlawful State behaviour in the penal 
context. As such, its significance cannot be overstated. The analysis above highlights that, in 
case law relating to Article 3 ECHR and punishment, the ECtHR addresses complex 
questions of penal theory – though not always overtly – and has tended to answer them with 
an emphasis on dignity, and a clear denouncement of the notion of being sent to prison for 
punishment rather than as punishment.
151
 Though puzzles arise out of the Court’s 
delimitation of the loaded terms ‘inhuman’ and ‘degrading’ in the context of punishment, the 
analysis above indicates that the Court’s doctrine does not undermine the absolute nature of 
Article 3 ECHR, and that the contextual factors impacting on its assessment are defensible in 
their connection to the value of dignity underpinning Article 3 of the ECHR. 
 
Moreover, though the precise implications regarding the type and timing of review required 
are likely to be the subject of a continuing legal saga,
152
 the broader landmark principles 
emanating from the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber judgment in Vinter are inescapable and likely 
to be pervasive: as of the Vinter judgment, rehabilitation occupies centre stage in the 
ECtHR’s delimitation of dignity-respecting and Article 3-compatible sentencing, 
imprisonment, and release mechanisms.  
 
As such, the retributive aim of minimum terms of imprisonment must make way for 
rehabilitation’s dominance and operate in a finite manner, allowing reducibility not only de 
jure but also de facto, the latter indicating that the prospect of release must arise within an 
individual’s foreseeable lifetime. It is also clear that the primacy of rehabilitation will seep 
into the way the ECtHR assesses prison conditions, the imposition of restrictive prison 
measures, and the scope of positive obligations under Article 3 ECHR, so that undermining 
rehabilitation, depriving individuals of rehabilitation opportunities, or even denying some 
basic means towards such rehabilitation, may raise an Article 3 issue. Indeed, the 
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acknowledged status of human dignity as being ‘the very essence’ of the Convention, 
combined with rehabilitation’s ties with dignity, entails that the emphasis on rehabilitation is 
likely to filter through to the interpretation of other Convention rights in the prison context, 
not least Article 8 of the ECHR. Moreover, both the dual reducibility requirement (de jure 
and de facto) and the link between rehabilitation and release established in Vinter are set to be 
significant in addressing the operation of indeterminate sentences and the treatment of those 
subject to these, including the rehabilitation opportunities they are offered.
153
 
 
Lastly, the Court’s evolving stance on punishment, culminating in Vinter, is likely to hold 
significant ramifications with respect to extradition cases. Many extradition requests from the 
United States often carry the prospect of whole life imprisonment, as was the situation in 
cases such as Harkins
154
 and Ahmad,
155
 as well as the UK case of Wellington.
156
 The 
outcomes of these cases, in which expulsion to face such a prospect was found not to be 
contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR, appear problematic after Vinter. The Court’s finding in 
Trabelsi
157
 affirms that the incompatibility of purely retributive whole life terms with Article 
3 of the ECHR will operate to bar a number of extraditions to the US and elsewhere, under 
the Chahal and Saadi principles.
158
 Moreover, the Court’s rehabilitative focus will inevitably 
be applied to its assessment, in extradition-related cases, of penal systems outside the ECHR; 
this carries the potential for the doctrine to permeate foreign penal terrain and ultimately the 
transnational and global arena.
159
  
 
From an academic perspective, the ECtHR’s interpretation of the absolute prohibition on 
inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 ECHR creates an intersection between 
penology and human rights which carries considerable significance for both fields. Given the 
ECtHR’s readiness to elaborate the principles surrounding the application of Article 3 ECHR 
to ‘punishment or treatment associated with it’ in a way which carries the potential to alter 
Contracting States’ penal landscapes, critical and constructive input in this process is vital 
and urgent.  
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